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WALTEE A. KAUFMAIN thought; one must only try to think it once more." 2 There is novelty in selection and composition which need not be sterile, superficial, or eclectic: the new Gestalt may involve a radical revaluation of the several components. It may be, as it were, of one piece-not patchwork but the symbolic reflection of the vision and experience of a man.
The nature of novelty is, however, best revealed by the human being himself-most clearly by those men whose historical influence was greatest. Originality is the hallmark of characterand of the life in which character manifests itself. Ideas are universal which are revealed in time: not as propositions proclaimed by a godhead, but through experiences which, to be understood, require the formulation of ideas. In this sense, ideas are never primary: they are reflections of experience and grounded in it. And few experiences are as profound, fascinating, and disturbing as that of a great man.
Much of history, therefore, and especially of the history of ideas, consists in the untiring efforts of posterity to recapture by sheer force of thought some "individuum ineffabile ". 3 In this sense, history has its clue, at least in part, in the biographies of great men. And it is in this light that Goethe's place in the history of ideas must be considered. A brief reference to other men with whom he is at one in this respect will help to place him and accentuate the framework in which we should envisage his unique contributions.
Three eminent examples from antiquity will suffice to make the point. First, there is Socrates, the greatest of the Greeks-and we should certainly not agree with Montaigne that "to be the first man in Greece is to be an easy first in the world." 4 It may seem that Socrates was effective largely through his method which exerted so profound an influence on Plato. Yet this method was adapted from that of Zeno, the Bleatic, and later versions of the dialectic have gone back to Plato or even Zeno more often than to Socrates. In this respect Socrates is but a link in a long chain. It is even worse when we consider his ideas: we do not know what they were, and the Apology suggests strongly that he made a point not of offering new ideas but of questioning old ones. What, then, of his influence? The Apology, together with the Crito, the conclusion of the Phaedo, and Alcibiades' speech in the Symposion, leaves no doubt that it was, more than anything, Socrates' personality which possessed the matchless mind of Plato and was reflected in his dialogues and, not a whit less, in all subsequent Greek and Hellenistic philosophy: Aristotelian and Cyrenaic no less than Epicurean and Stoic. The image of the proud and ironically disdainful sage who found in self-sufficient reflection a happiness and freedom far surpassing that of any plutocrat or despot -this truly original embodiment of human dignity captivated all the later thinkers of antiquity, became their ethical ideal, and led to a new conception of man. Socrates' fearlessly questioning iconoclasm and unhesitating decision to die rather than cease speaking out freely have had an equal impact on the modern mind. The character and bearing of this man have influenced the whole course of the history of philosophy more than has any idea or even any system. Caesar, the greatest of the Eomans, offers a strikingly similar picture. His name has entered the languages of the world, and his personality has revolutionized not only political theory but, far more, man's conception of himself and of his potentialities. Caesar did not develop a new form of government: there had been very similar administrations before, and those of the later Caesars, Kaiser, and Tsars were different from his in many ways. What the honorable Brutus could not kill was not an idea but, paradoxically, a life-and the personality which stood revealed in it.
Our last and most obvious example is Jesus. 4a Eecent apologists have sought to credit him with some new notion. Having lost their faith in the Trinity, they felt it incumbent on themselves to establish Jesus' greatness on the foundation of a novel insight; and whatever conception they fastened on, they have often defended with as much zeal and disregard for impartial scholarship as any dogmatist. While there is room for doubt whether Jesus had any new idea which could not be found in earlier Jewish or Hellenistic writers, not to speak of Taoists and Buddhists, it seems 4a The historic impact of the Incarnation falls outside the scope of the present essay.
plain that his character and life have made history even more than Socrates' or Caesar's. Subsequent thought and events, scarcely less than Western painting, can be viewed to a considerable extent as a ceaseless attempt to assimilate a character which has so far defied almost every effort.
There is no need for multiplying examples by proceeding, say, to Lincoln or Napoleon. The most influential men have made history neither by armed might nor by theories. If this view should seem to be prompted by some current vogue of anti-intellectualism, one may recall that Hegel, certainly neither an irrationalist nor one to deprecate philosophy, especially his own, arrived at much the same conclusion. Philosophy, he contended, is reflection and must necessarily look back rather than forward. Philosophic ideas, instead of making history, elicit its meaning only ex post facto, even as night descends and an era draws to a close: When philosophy paints its grey on grey, a form of life has become old, and with grey on grey it cannot be rejuvenated, only comprehended. The owl of Minerva begins its flight only as the twilight sets in. Ironically, it was just Marx-renowned for his alleged deprecation of the ideational factor in history-who criticized Hegel for being too resigned about the efficacy of human thought. Perhaps human consciousness was actually assigned a more crucial role in Marx's interpretation of history, while Hegel emphasized the significance of individuality more than Marx did. But this is not the place to discuss the metaphysics of the world spirit, the "cunning of reason," the importance of the economic factor, or the problems of pluralistic causation. Suffice it to insist that one of the decisive elements in the historical process is to be found in the personalities and lives of its leading characters, and that Goethe was one of these. # # # Goethe's influence is clearly a function of his works as well as of his personality, and it might be supposed that his creations embody his ideas. After all, no other poet has developed such intricate scientific theories or been in such steady communion with the great intellects of his time. Goethe's novels manifest an increasing concern with intellectual issues, and so does his Faust. Moreover, he himself stressed his debt to Spinoza; the influence 5 Bechtsphilosophie, preface.
of Leibniz may seem even more striking; and some of his finest poems appear to be philosophic. His aphorisms, letters, and conversations abound in keen insights. One cannot doubt that he had a most powerful intellect and surpassing wisdom. His characteristic greatness, however, is not a function of these qualities, and his great works are invariably not primarily vehicles for his ideas.
This goes without saying for such lyrical poems as tiber alien Gipfeln or such outcries as Prometheus and the Marienbader Elegie. Yet it will be asked: what of Faust, so often hailed as Goethe's masterpiece? Faust, I should answer, is not a philosophic poem, and it neither reveals nor illustrates Goethe's Weltanschauung, let alone his "philosophy." The ideational Leitmotif of the drama-"Wer immer strebend sich bemuht, Den konnen wir erlosen" 6 -is, in this characteristically unqualified form, not even the core of Goethe's magna confessio, nor the theory for which one might find the experiment or demonstration in Goethe's life. We shall see later that Goethe and Faust are almost antithetical characters. First, however, let us inquire what the drama is, if it is not a poetic presentation of Goethe's ideas.
Neither Gretchen's death sentence at the end of Faust I nor the traditionally religious trappings of the closing scene of Faust II represent a theory of morals or religion. Shakespeare, not Dante, was our poet's model: instead of illustrating another man's philosophy, he let his poetic imagination reflect the cosmos, unimpeded by, and without the benefit of, any theoretical framework.
"Am farbigen Abglanz haben wir das Leben"
1 -that is the poet's philosophy: not just Goethe's, but that of the poet in general. Goethe was a poets' poet and the embodiment of the aesthetic temperament no less than Socrates was the incarnation of the philosophic spirit.
Schiller's pertinent contrast of "naive and sentimental (sentimentalisch)" poetry is well known, but one of Goethe's aphorisms is at least as relevant and incomparably more concise : It makes a big difference whether the poet seeks the particular for the universal or whether he beholds the universal in the particular. From the first procedure originates allegory, where the particular is considered only as an illustration, as an example of the universal. The latter, however, is properly the nature o£ poetry: it expresses something particular without thinking of the universal or pointing to it. Whoever grasps this particular in a living way will simultaneously receive the universal, too, without becoming aware of it-or only late. 8 One should keep this in mind when one considers the usual disputes about Goethe's ideas. When the poet mitigated the original ending of Faust I by adding the line "She is saved," or when he concluded the Wahlverwandtschaften with a reference to the "friendly moment when they will once awaken again together," he was not avowing any faith in another life in which all wrongs are redressed. The essentially aesthetic bent of his mind and its sovereign Shakespearean playfulness-the word is not too extreme, if its literal denotation is allowed to soften it-are ignored all too often.
Some of the most celebrated quotations from Faust probably throw less light on their author than does this sarcastic retort, seeing that it came from the lips of one who so often referred to himself as a pagan : I pagan? Well, after all I let Gretchen be executed and Ottilie starve to death. Don't people find that Christian enough? What do they want that would be more Christian? 9 This rejoinder not only crystallizes-as perfectly as that can be done-the contrast between the original "glad tidings" (evangel) and the resentful bourgeois morality which purports to be Christian even while it insists on throwing the first stone; the remark also goes far to elucidate Gretchen glanz-of life. Beyond that, however, they represent an Olympic concession to society: the appeasing gesture of one whose paganism was anything but zealous, aggressive, or "Dionysian."
The last lines of Faust I and the Wahlverwandtschaften do not indicate the poet's adherence to any traditional dogma. They give aesthetic expression to his experience of human hearts ironically and hypocritically divided against themselves. Because there is no question here of any critique prompted by a rival theory of ethics, no new symbolism is required; and Goethe is naturally led to administer his rebuke-even this word is too intellectual-out of the very bosom of the tradition which he takes to task. In the same way, Christian symbolism is employed at the end of Faust II as a vehicle for the poet's negation of what he took to be conventional Christian morality: Faust is saved. What is revealed is not a new idea and certainly no philosophy, but the poetic vision of a world which preaches both the law and grace, conformity and individuality, convention and intention.
One may note that Goethe did not avail himself of Christian symbolism when he dealt with themes one would generally consider Christian, like the Incarnation or the redemptive power of love. Thus he transports us to Hindu India both in Der Pariah and in Der Gott und die Bajadere.
He was not trying to allegorize traditional truths but seeking to express an original experience which called for new imagery. Perhaps the poems were first envisaged in the fresh encounter with some Indian lore. In any case, it was not a body of ideas but an unprecedented personal vision which had to be made manifest. To summarize: while Goethe's influence was a function of his works as well as of his character, the works themselves are not allegorical representations of ideas but the characteristic function of his personality.
These general reflections on the history of ideas and on the nature of Goethe's creations set the stage for our estimate of Goethe's influence. "We shall not tarry over his well-known influence on Carlyle and Coleridge, on Matthew Arnold and Emerson, or over the equally familiar impact of his personality on Schiller's aesthetic theories-and hence on much subsequent work done in that field. Still better known and more important is the liberating effect of the young Goethe's character on the stuffy and sterile Germany of Klopstock and Gellert-the light he kindled in the hearts of a new generation, the age of genius he inaugurated. These matters need only be mentioned to be remembered.
There are other perspectives which lack this traditional sanction, and it is these I propose to deal with now. Let us proceed in medias res. Out of the Gothic chaos of the German past, Goethe distilled a national character which was accepted by his people as their ideal prototype: Faust. It is doubtful whether there is any real parallel to this feat-that a great nation should assign such a role to a largely fictitious character, presented to it so late in its history.
A nation's conception of itself determines in large measure its attitude toward its own past as well as-and this seems even more significant-toward its future behavior. Goethe's vision of Faust is therefore not only a major clue to the Eomantics' anthologies and historiography but also a decisive factor in the shaping of German history during the past century and a half. This claim must seem extravagant to anyone unfamiliar with the idolatry of Faust in the German schools. Yet this golem has produced effects no less considerable than those of his maker, and our discussion will revolve around these two focal points and their interrelation-Goethe and Faust.
We behold Faust sacrificing Gretchen to his own self-realization-or, even more characteristically, Faust closing both eyes while Mephistopheles advances the fulfillment of his ultimate ambitions by ruthlessly destroying Philemon and Baucis. This egoistic disregard for the concrete human being, this utter ignorance of human rights and love, and this unbounded will to power over everything and everybody but one's self cause us to wonder why the interpreters of Faust have failed to find in it the frightful dangers of the German character and a prophetic vision of its later vices. The vast majority of German students, to be sure, have never heard of Philemon and Baucis (though they know of Gretchen)-but their teachers have; and the training, outlook, and ideals of generations of teachers and large portions of a nation's intelligentsia are of singular significance. Goethe's dramatization of Faust may thus be considered one of the many factors which helped to bring about historic outrages by giving the Germans so intoxicating a picture of themselves.
We may seem to have gone far in our speculation. Perhaps we find support in the consideration-hardly subject to any serious objection-that the vastly influential Eomantic movement in Germany drew its inspiration from the work of the young Goethe. 9 * What was this movement if not a hopeless chase after his personality, the often ridiculous desire to equal his genius, Ms resurrection of G-oetz, Faust, and the heroic past, and his cult of creativity? Here is the clue to much of Fichte's and Schelling's philosophies and to the literary activities of the Schlegels and Brentano.
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And it was among these Eomantics that modern German nationalism and Teutonism was bred. If theirs had a Christian tinge, so did Wagner's and Chamberlain's. If the Wartburg men were self-styled liberals, the Nazis called themselves socialists.
11
Historical causation is extremely complex and cannot be dealt with adequately by the mere assertion of an influence. The question always remains why the later generation should have let itself be influenced by one factor rather than another. It would be rash to assume that priority entails responsibility. The present case offers a particularly striking illustration. For the Eomantics ' vision of neither Goethe nor Faust should be mistaken for the real Goethe who repudiated the Eomantics unequivocally. He was the author of Der West-Ostliche Divan no less than of Faust, a translator as well as a poet, and the coiner of the word, if not the concept of, Weltliteratur.
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He ever insisted:
There is no patriotic art and no patriotic science! Both belong, like all that is high and good, to the whole world and can be promoted only by 9a What they saw in Faust and Meister were the conceptions of the young Goethe, rather than the later qualifications; and 0. Harnack has shown how F. Schlegel read his own intentions into Meister, not Goethe's. Even these qualifications are unnecessary if "young Goethe" is understood as an inclusive contrast to "old Goethe." 10 Schopenhauer's conception of the relentlessly striving Will may be considered a cosmic projection of Faust's ceaseless striving-pushing endlessly and purposelessly into infinity.
11 The many striking similarities between the Wartburg "liberals"-Hegel has often been reviled for denouncing them-and the Nazis have been pointed out by Herbert Marcuse, Reason and 'Revolution (Oxford University Press 1941), 178 ££.
12 Eckermann, January 31 and July 15,1827, and Werke, Ausgabe letzter Hand, XLVI, 141, 260 and XLIX, 127, 137 ff. universal and free interaction of all who live at the same time. . . .
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Is it Goethe's fault that he has never been popular with his people as the incarnate anti-Eomantic and Good European! Yet it is a tragic fact that the Germans have, on the whole, worshipped Faust while having little use for the old Goethe.
13a
Let us consider the vast difference between Faust and Goethe -the Faust of the second part no less than the first. Goethe, unlike Faust, did not sacrifice the present to the future or value the moment only as a foretaste of things to come. He knew that "a succession of consecutive moments is . . . always a kind of eternity," and he found "permanence in the transitory." 14 To Eckermann he said: "ever hold fast to the present . . . every moment is of infinite value, for it is the representative of a whole eternity."
15
When Goethe hurt others, whether the beloved Friederike or the young poet, Heinrich von Kleist, it was notFaustlike-in the wanton quest of self-aggrandizement or an external projection of his power, but part of his daily dose of painful self-denial and his economy of creation: a matter of life and death today, not an unscrupulous calculated risk for the day after tomorrow. The cliche of Goethe's "great confession" should not deceive us into assuming any real parallel between the author and his heroes. The Gretchen tragedy is no more a portrayal of Goethe's treatment of Friederike than the infamous Weislingen or Tasso, so utterly lacking in self-control, are accurate representations of their maker. Goethe's own experience merely kindled his poetic imagination, and the creation of these splendid caricatures of his failings let him breathe more freely. Again, was it Goethe's fault if Germany could not assimilate his greatness, rejected him, and idolized-not indeed a golden calf but a scapegoat, Faust?
To be sure, we should not claim that Faust is nothing but the dross of Goethe's gradual refinement, although the Gothic past and the Eomantic future were indeed what our poet sought to overcome. I should suspect that Faust reflects, to some extent, 13 Mamimen und Eeflexionen V. 13a There is a striking difference in this respect between the popular attitude referred to here, and many excellent works about Goethe; e.g., Hehn's, Harnack's, SimmeFs, Gundolf's, Beutler's.
14 Goethe's last letter to Zelter. 15 November 3, 1823.
Goethe's experience of the idol of his youth, Frederick the Great. It is often assumed, falsely, that the king's brilliant victories at the beginning of the Seven Years' War brought about his final triumph; but his early successes were wiped out by the disastrous defeat at Kunersdorf and the Russian occupation of Berlin. More memorable than any battle was Frederick's decision to hold out and to stay in the field, shifting small forces (no large ones were left) wherever they were most needed-never resting, although no reasonable chance of victory remained. Only the death of the Tsarina and her successor's stunning order to his troops to change sides saved the king: Wer immer strebend sich bemitht, Den konnen wir erlosen.
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And did not the aging king, in his last years, when peace had come, design a project to drain and colonize the Oder-Bruch? In some ways, the old Faust may reflect the personality of Frederick more than that of Goethe. Unfortunately, the character of the enlightened anti-Gothic king has been less influential than its colorful reflection in Faust. Goethe himself, in the text of Faust, likened the Philemon and Baucis episode to the Biblical tale of Naboth's vineyard. Frederick, in an exactly parallel situation, let his miller keep his mill -not as a matter of capricious grace, but in explicit recognition of the rights of man. And Frederick's austere self-control, no less than the refinement of his personality, furnishes the most striking contrast to the Nazis. While one could trace the gradual and steady decline from Frederick and Faust through the Romantics and Wagner to the Hitler movement, one should keep in mind that the Nazis represent the ultimate fruition of all the failings of the German character-unmitigated by its undoubted genius.
To return to Goethe: he made history not only through his Faust. His Divan, for example, inspired Riickert's and Platen's artful translations of Persian poetry; and German scholarship has done much to give substance to Goethe's conception of world literature. Above all, however, the heritage of the mature Goethe was developed by Hegel, Heine, and Nietzsche. Perhaps this is more obvious in the case of the cosmopolitan poet than in that of the two philosophers, and a word of explanation may not be amiss.
The old Goethe has been made familiar in our time by Thomas Mann. Yet since Mann tends, rather more than Goethe, to draw self-portraits, he has exaggerated the bourgeois (burgerliche) elements in his hero. I see Goethe more nearly as did Nietzsche, who was, incidentally, almost the first great German writer to realize and emphasize the surpassing greatness of the old Goethe and to find in the conversations with Eckermann, not in Faust, "the best German book,' m Goethe as the living embodiment of Selbsiuberwindung can be understood only against the background of his youth, of Werther, Goetz, Prometheus, and the Urfaustbut not as an old man embarrassed by the passions of his past, as one of millions whose maturity involves the loss of all their force and fire:
Nur der verdieni sick Freiheit wie das Leben, Der taglich sie erobern muss.
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Life he had to conquer ever again in his ceaseless cdmbat with ill health and sickness unto death-and freedom, in his daily fight with passions which others, for the most part, do not know and which he harnessed into ever new creations.
Goethe so considered is the historic event which Nietzsche's whole philosophy attempts to recapture in aphorisms. Goethe, not Faust, served as the prototype of Nietzsche's superman. The "Bad Infinity"-to speak in HegePs terms-of Faust's unbounded striving was explicitly repudiated by Nietzsche, who preached the glory of the moment. And the greatest power was, to Nietzsche's mind, not power over others but the perfect selfcontrol and creativity of the old Goethe. To be sure, that did not keep his "Faustian" interpreters from following the established procedure of blandly putting Faust in Goethe's place.
Goethe's influence on Hegel was no less great and can be traced from Hegel's first book to his last-from his attempt in the Phanomenologie to emulate Wilhelm Meister by writing the Bildungsromam of God himself to the contention in the RechtspMlosophie that freedom is to be found only in self-limitation and that, while absolute freedom can be found only in the realm of "Absolute Spirit," i.e., in art, religion and philosophy, these pursuits must be grounded in a responsible civic existence-like Goethe's as a minister of state in Weimar.
Nietzsche, who also considered art and philosophy man's noblest enterprises, illustrated his diametrically opposite claim that they can prosper only apart from all civic existence and that culture thrives only at the expense of the State, by also citing Goethe -the Alpine recluse did not take the Weimar court as seriously as the Berlin professor. Moreover, Nietzsche was keenly aware of Goethe's Olympic contempt for civic conventions, and he insisted passionately and repeatedly on Goethe's anti-political opposition to the "Wars of Liberation."
Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche could all have said to Goethe, with Hegel: When I survey the course of my spiritual development, I see you everywhere woven into it and would like to call myself one of your sons; my inward nature has ... set its course by your creations as by signal fires.
19
In other words, nineteenth-century German philosophy consisted, to a considerable extent, in a series of efforts to assimilate the phenomenon of Goethe. As in the case of Socrates, it was not a body of ideas that influenced the philosophers, but it was a personality which was variously reflected in their systems. # # #
Having considered Goethe's surpassing significance for the contents of the history of ideas, let us conclude with a very few words about how he revolutionized its form. His highly personal poems and dramas should be considered together with the fact that his Wilhelm Meister established the genre of the Bildungsroman-a literary form taken up by the Eomantics, by Gottfried Keller, and in our time by Thomas Mann and Hermann Hesse, to mention only a very few of the best known German writers. What is at stake is far more than a literary convention; it is a new way of approaching the human being, a new vision of man. Yet it is once again not a new theory or philosophic anthropology but a projection of Goethe's character and life. He experienced himself-if I may coin a phrase-sub specie temporis, and his character, life, and work cannot be understood except under the category of development.
